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When a keyword-based search query is received by a search engine, a classified ads website, or an online retailer site,
the platform has exponentially many choices in how to sort the search results. Two extreme rules are (a) to use a ranking
based on estimated relevance only, which improves customer experience in the long run because of perceived quality,
and (b) to use a ranking based only on the expected revenue to be generated by immediate conversions, which maximizes
short-term revenue. Typically, these two objectives (and the corresponding rankings) differ. A key question then is what
middle ground between them should be chosen. We introduce stochastic models that yield elegant solutions for this
situation, and we propose effective solution methods to compute a ranking strategy that optimizes long-term revenues.
This strategy has a very simple form and is easy to implement. It consists in ordering the output items by decreasing
order of a score attributed to each. This score results from evaluating a simple function of the estimated relevance, the
expected revenue of the link, and a real-valued parameter. We find the latter via simulation-based optimization, and its
optimal value is related to the endogeneity of user activity in the platform as a function of the relevance offered to them.
1. Introduction
Electronic commerce via the Internet has increased and evolved tremendously in recent years. Marketplaces
in which participants can conveniently buy, sell, or rent a huge variety of objects and services are now com-
mon. The Internet has evolved into a complex ecosystem of companies for which various business models
have proved profitable. Among them, we find search engines (SEs) such as Google, that allow users to find
content of their interest on the web, and use these interactions to create opportunities to sell ads; online
retailers such as Amazon.com that act as intermediaries between producers and consumers; and classified
ad websites such as eBay that allow sellers or service-providers, and buyers or service-consumers, respec-
tively, to meet and conduct transactions. Another example includes online retailers that list for-sale items in
a web page, such as Amazon and e-Bay clones. To be profitable, those marketplaces typically rely on one
1
L’Ecuyer et al.: Revenue-Maximizing Rankings
2
or more of the following revenue streams. Some charge a commission equal to a percentage of the agreed
price-tag (e.g., eBay or Airbnb). Some marketplaces provide a basic service for free but change sellers to
display their items in premium locations or for keeping them on for additional time (e.g., leboncoin.fr in
France, or Mercado Libre in Latin America). Some increase their revenue by offering additional services
such as insurance or delivery for a fee. Finally, some also rely on third-party advertisers that display text,
banners, images, videos, etc., within the pages of the marketplace in exchange for payment.
A common feature in all those platforms is that when a user connects to them and enters a query, the
site provides a list of relevant items (e.g., links, products, services, classified ads) that may match what
the user wants. To provide the best value to users, the platform would ideally present the relevant items by
decreasing order of (estimated) relevance, so the user is more likely to find the most appropriate ones. By
doing this, the site can increase its reputation and attract more user visits. Measures of relevance can be
based on various criteria, which are sometimes selected by the user. For example eBay provides relevance-
based rankings that can account for time until the end of the auction, distance, price, etc. How to assign
a relevance value to each item returned by a query depends on the intrinsic details of the platform. For
example, eBay may use the string distance between the query and the item descriptions as well as the rating
of the seller, Amazon may use the number of conversions for a product and its quality, and Google may
use the Pagerank algorithm (Google 2011). Methods to define and compute relevance indices have been
the subject of several studies, especially for SEs. Examples include Avrachenkov and Litvak (2004), Austin
(2006), Auction Insights (2008), Williams (2010). In this paper, we are not concerned with how to define
and compute these measures of relevance (this is outside our scope); we assume that they are given as part
of the input data.
In addition, each matching item returned by a query has an expected revenue that could be obtained
directly or indirectly by the platform owner when the user visits the item. The platform may have interest
in taking this expected revenue into account when ranking the items, by placing highly-profitable ones in
prominent positions. However, a myopic approach that ranks the items only in terms of expected revenue
and not on relevance would decrease the reputation in the long run, and eventually decrease the number
of user visits and future revenues. A good compromise should account for both relevance and expected
revenue. In a nutshell, the algorithm we propose can be directly used to compute optimal rankings that can
balance profit with user activity.
A request is abstracted out in our model as a random vector that contains a relevance index and an
expected revenue for each matching item. For the purpose of this study, the distribution of this random vector
is assumed to be known and time-stationary. Estimating (or learning) this distribution from actual data is of
course important for practical implementations, but is outside the scope of this paper. In real applications,
this distribution is likely to change with time, at a slower time scale than the arrivals of requests, and the
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ranking strategy would be updated accordingly whenever deemed appropriate. This aspect is also beyond
our scope.
In addition to the regular output that includes organic results, most platforms also display paid ads (also
referred to as sponsored results). Our study focuses on the ordering of the organic results only. We assume
that the average arrival rate of search requests is an increasing function of the average relevance of organic
results, and is not affected by the choice and ordering of the sponsored results. This makes sense because
the latter ordering is not likely to have much impact on the future arrival rate of requests. On the other
hand, the total expected revenue from sponsored search depends on the arrival rate of requests. Our model
accounts for this with a coefficient that represents the expected ad revenue per request, which we multiply
by the arrival rate. There is an extensive literature on pricing and ranking sponsored results. For details, we
refer the reader to Varian (2007), Edelman et al. (2007), Lahaie et al. (2007), Athey and Ellison (2011),
Maille´ et al. (2012), and the references therein. However, the impact of using alternative rankings to classify
organic results has not yet received a similar level of attention.
The purpose of our work is to study the best compromise that can be made by the platform to account for
both relevance and expected revenue when ranking the items returned by a query, to maximize the long-term
expected revenue per unit of time. Our aim is to find an optimal ordering strategy that takes both effects into
account. We want a model whose solution has a simple and elegant form, and that can inform the design of
ranking policies, as opposed to a detailed and complicated model whose solution has no simple form. We
propose a ranking policy that relies on a single real-valued parameter. This value can be optimized efficiently
using simulation-based methods. The optimal solution is related to the importance of the endogeneity of
user visits caused by the relevance offered by the ranking policy. For more realistic models that relax some
of our assumptions, this type of policy can be used as a heuristic. Our model and algorithms also permit
one to compare the optimal policy to other possible rankings—such as those based on relevance only or
those based on short-term revenue only—in terms of expected revenue for the platform, expected revenue
for the various content providers, and consumer welfare (captured by the resulting quality).
The expected relevance and expected income per request depend on the ranking policy used to select
a permutation (ranking) of the items returned by a query. The ranking can be based on the estimated rel-
evance and the expected revenue of each matching item. A deterministic ranking policy assigns to each
possible request a single permutation (always the same). However, we will give examples in which no deter-
ministic policy can be optimal. We will therefore consider a richer class of randomized ranking policies
which to each request assign a probability distribution on the set of permutations of all matching items.
Whenever a request arrives, the platform selects a ranking using the probabilities specified by the policy for
this request. Of course, computing and implementing such general policies, deterministic or randomized,
appears impractical, because the number of possible requests is typically huge, so there would be way too
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many permutations or probabilities to compute and store. For this reason, we are interested in developing a
model for which we can prove that an optimal policy has a much simpler form, and is easier to implement.
Our main contribution is the characterization of such an optimal ranking policy. We show that for our
model, an optimal policy must always rank the relevant items by decreasing order of their score, where
the score of each item is a real number defined as a linear combination of a function of the estimated
relevance and a function of the expected gain, in which the first coefficient can be taken as 1 and the second
coefficient (the same for all items and requests) can be optimized. If the scores of matching items are all
distinct with probability 1 (i.e., for almost all requests), finding the optimal coefficient specifies an optimal
deterministic policy which has a very simple form, so we have reached our goal. This generally happens
if the requests have a continuous probability density. But one may argue that in reality, the requests have a
discrete distribution, in which case equalities between two or more scores occur with positive probability.
The bad news is that in that case, only randomized policies can be optimal in general. Any optimal policy
would still sort the matching items by order of score, but it must randomize the order of those having the
same score, with specific optimal probabilities. In practice, if the probability of an equality is small, to avoid
computing the optimal probabilities for randomization, one may opt to forget the randomization to break
ties and just use an arbitrary ordering in case of equality, as an approximation. We propose a more robust
strategy: add a small random perturbation (uniform over a small interval centered at 0) to the expected
revenue of each item, so scores are all distinct with probability 1. The impact of this perturbation on the
expected long-term revenue can be made arbitrarily small by taking the size of the interval small enough.
The modified model admits a deterministic optimal policy and one can just use this policy. This can also be
viewed as a different (simpler) way of randomizing the policy.
Balancing between immediate revenue and long-term impact on future arrivals, when choosing a policy, is
not a novel idea; see, e.g., Mendelson and Whang (1990), Maglaras and Zeevi (2003), Besbes and Maglaras
(2009). In those articles, one selects the price of a service (or the prices for different classes) to maximize
the long-term revenue given that each arriving customer has a random price threshold under which she takes
the service. The systems have capacity constraints and there can be congestion, which degrades the service
quality. The strategy corresponds to the selected prices, which can be time-dependent. The derivations in
those papers differ from what we do here in many aspects. The authors use approximations, e.g, by heavy-
traffic limits, to select the prices. Aflaki and Popescu (2014) also compute a continuous policy (for the
service level of a single customer) in a dynamic context, using dynamic programming (DP). Their solutions
are algorithmic.
The model considered here obviously simplifies reality, as do virtually all models whose solution has a
simple form. While there are many other “simple” heuristics that platforms may use to factor in profitability
in their algorithms, the one we obtain here is not only clear and simple, but is also proved to be optimal for
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a reasonable model. We think this is a nice insight that can inform platforms on how to better position their
results to tradeoff relevance with profits.
A major initial motivation of our work is the search neutrality debate, in which some argue that SEs
should be seen as a public service and therefore should be regulated to have their organic search results
based only on objective measures of relevance, while others think they should be free to rank items in the
way they think is best and to compete against each other freely. One key issue in this debate is whether
platforms use rankings that depend on for revenue-making ingredients (Crowcroft 2007). For example,
Google may favor YouTube pages for the extra revenue they generate. This type of search bias has been
amply documented in experiments (Edelman and Lockwood 2011, Wright 2012, Maille´ and Tuffin 2014).
In this context, the framework we introduce can be of interest both to platform owners, to improve their
ranking rules, and to regulators, to study the impact of various types of regulations on users and on overall
social welfare.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our modeling framework and state
the optimization problem in terms of randomized policies. In Section 3, we derive a general characterization
of the optimal policies and we obtain optimality conditions for the two situations where the requests have
a discrete and a continuous distribution. For the continuous case, in which the requests have a density, we
show that the optimal policy is completely specified by a unique scalar. This number is used to combine
relevances and revenues into scores, which are used to rank the items in decreasing order. This works
because all the matching items for each request have different scores with probability 1. This policy is very
easy to implement and one does not need to consider the exponentially-many possible orderings. We provide
algorithms to appropriately compute or estimate this scalar number. In Section 4, we provide numerical
examples to illustrate the algorithms and what could be done with the model. Finally, we offer concluding
remarks in Section 5.
2. Model Formulation
We define our model in the context of a SE that receives keyword-based queries and generates a list of
organic results using links to relevant and/or profitable web pages. By changing the interpretation, the model
applies to other marketplaces such as electronic retailers and classified-ad websites, as described in the
introduction.
For each arriving request (i.e., a query sent to the SE by a user), different content providers (CPs) host
pages that can be relevant to that request. Let M ≥ 0 be the (random) number of pages that match the
arriving request, i.e., deemed worthy of consideration for this particular request, out of the universe of
all pages available online. We assume that M has a global deterministic upper bound m0 < ∞, inde-
pendent of the request. When M > 0, each page i = 1, . . . ,M has a relevance value Ri ∈ [0,1], and an
expected revenue per click for the SE of Gi ∈ [0,K], where K is a positive constant. Thus, a request can
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be encoded as a random vector Y = (M,R1,G1, . . . ,RM ,GM) whose components satisfy the conditions
just given. We assume that Y has a probability distribution (discrete or continuous) over a subspace Ω ⊆
∪m0m=0({m} × ([0,1]× [0,K])m). The variable Ri is a measure of how the SE thinks finding page i would
please the author of the request. The variable Gi contains the total expected revenue that the SE might
receive directly or indirectly, from third-party advertisement displayed on page i if the user clicks on that
link. In particular, if the CP of page i receives an expected revenue per click for page i, and a fixed fraction
of this revenue is transmitted to the SE, then Gi contains this expected revenue transferred to the SE. If
the SE is also the CP for some pages, then the fraction is 1 for those pages. We denote a realization of Y
by y = (m,r1, g1, . . . , rm, gm). Note that the probability distribution of Y represents the arrival process of
queries. Actually, there is a choice in selecting what this process represents exactly: it may be the aggre-
gate user base of the platform, a subgroup, or even a single user if enough data is available to estimate the
distribution. Of course, the relevance of each link must be estimated in agreement with this choice.
After receiving a request y ∈Ω, the SE selects a permutation pi= (pi(1), . . . , pi(m))∈Πm of themmatch-
ing pages, where Πm is the set of permutations of {1, . . . ,m}, and displays the links in the corresponding
order. The link to page i is presented in position j = pi(i).
The click-through-rate (CTR) of a link that points to a page is defined as the probability that the user
clicks on that link (Hanson and Kalyanam 2007, Chapter 8). This probability generally depends on the
relevance of the link and its position in the ranking. For a given request y, we denote the CTR of page i
placed in position j by ci,j(y). Our results will be derived under the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION A. The CTR function has the separable form ci,j(y) = θj ψ(ri), where 1 ≥ θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥
· · · ≥ θm0 > 0 is a non-increasing sequence of fixed positive constants that describe the importance of each
position in the ranking, and ψ : [0,1]→ [0,1] is a non-decreasing function that maps the relevance ri to a
position-independent click probability for the page.
This separability assumption of the CTR is pervasive in the e-Commerce literature (Varian 2007, Maille´
et al. 2012). We will rely on it to derive optimality conditions in Section 3, but in the rest of this section it is
not needed, so we will use both the general notation ci,j(y) and the specific separable version, for the sake
of generality and because it facilitates the reading in some places. We define r˜i :=ψ(ri)ri and g˜i :=ψ(ri)gi,
so that we can write ci,j(y)ri = θj r˜i and ci,j(y)gi = θj g˜i, and the corresponding notation with tildes for the
random variables Y , Ri, and Gi.
If we select permutation pi for request y, the corresponding expected relevance (the local relevance) is
defined by
r(pi, y) :=
m∑
i=1
ci,pi(i)(y)ri =
m∑
i=1
θpi(i)r˜i. (1)
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It captures the attractiveness of this ordering pi for this particular y, from the consumer’s perspective. The
expected revenue to the SE from the organic links for this request is
g(pi, y) :=
m∑
i=1
ci,pi(i)(y)gi =
m∑
i=1
θpi(i)g˜i. (2)
A (deterministic) stationary ranking policy µ is a function that assigns a permutation pi = µ(y) to each
possible realization y ∈Ω. (We skip the technical issues of measurability of policies in this paper; this can
be handled as in Bertsekas and Shreve (1978), for example.) By taking the expectation with respect to the
distribution of input requests Y , we obtain the long-term value induced by a stationary ranking policy µ.
The expected relevance per request for policy µ (which we use as proxy of the reputation of the SE) is
r := r(µ) =E[r(µ(Y ), Y )] (3)
and the expected revenue per request from the organic links for the SE is
g := g(µ) =E[g(µ(Y ), Y )]. (4)
Note that 0 ≤ r ≤ supy∈Ω, pi∈Πm
∑m
i=1 ci,pi(i)(y) ≤ m0, where m corresponds to request y, and similarly
0≤g≤m0K.
We also consider randomized policies, motivated by the fact that in some situations they can do better
than the best deterministic policy (we will give an example of that). A randomized stationary ranking policy
is a function µ˜ that assigns, to each y ∈Ω, a probability distribution over the set of permutations Πm. One
has µ˜(y) = {q(pi, y) : pi ∈Πm}, where q(pi, y) is the probability of selecting pi. The expressions for r and g
for a policy µ˜ are then
r := r(µ˜) =E
[ ∑
pi∈ΠM
q(pi,Y )
M∑
i=1
ci,pi(i)(Y )Ri
]
(5)
and
g := g(µ˜) =E
[ ∑
pi∈ΠM
q(pi,Y )
M∑
i=1
ci,pi(i)(Y )Gi
]
. (6)
Notice that although r an g depend on µ or µ˜, as defined in (3) and (4) or in (5) and (6), if understood
from the context, we omit the dependency to simplify notation. The objective for the SE is to maximize
a long-term utility function of the form ϕ(r, g) where ϕ is a strictly increasing function of r and g, with
bounded second derivatives over [0,m0] × [0,m0K]. An optimal policy from the perspective of the SE
is a stationary ranking policy µ in the deterministic case, or µ˜ in the randomized case, that maximizes
ϕ(r, g). Always ranking the pages by decreasing order of Ri would maximize r, whereas ranking them by
decreasing order of Gi would maximize g. An optimal policy must usually make a compromise in between
these two extremes.
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In this paper we assume that requests arrive according to a point process whose average arrival rate (per
unit of time) is λ(r), where λ : [0,m0]→ [0,∞) is an increasing, positive, continuously differentiable, and
bounded function. The expected gain per request (on average) from the ads and sponsored links placed on
the page that provides the organic links, is assumed to be a constant β that does not depend on the ordering
of the organic links. This expected gain adds up to g, so the long-term expected revenue per unit of time is
ϕ(r, g) = λ(r)(β+ g). (7)
Although (7) is the objective function we have in mind, we keep using the general notation ϕ(r, g) because it
sometimes better indicates what we are doing and because our results apply more generally. The properties
we will derive stand with this general formulation, and are not a consequence of the separability in terms of
r and g. Our definition of λ(r) implies that it does not depend on the ordering of sponsored links. That is,
sponsored links (paid ads) do not drive users to the website in the long term. Note that the arrival rate does
not have to be constant; it can be periodic for example, with a time average of λ(r).
Other important simplifying assumptions in our model are that the distribution of Y is stationary and
does not depend on the ranking policy, and that the average arrival rate depends only on the single global
relevance measure r. In real life, the distribution of Y may change over time, but our model is a good
approximation over a shorter time scale. We also do not distinguish requests at a finer granularity than the
definition of the global distribution of Y (e.g., if Y represents the aggregate user population, we don’t distin-
guish individual users). The measures r and g are averages across all queries. Another relevant issue related
to the previous point is whether one can assume, as we do, that this distribution remains (approximately)
the same when we change the ordering policy. In real life, the choice of policy can have an impact on the
distribution of Y , e.g., by attracting more queries of certain types only. To address this situation, one can
segment the space of queries (partition by user type, topic, etc.) and apply the model to each segment. Then
each segment can have its own distribution of Y , pair (r, g), and policy. This can be useful if the optimal
policies differ markedly across segments. Developing effective ways of making this segmentation can be a
topic for further research. In principle, one could have a very large number of small segments, even a single
IP address or user for a segment, but in practice one must also have enough data to estimate the distribution
of Y in each segment. So there would be a tradeoff between the accuracy of the model (more segments) and
the ability to estimate the parameters (more data per segment).
For the model defined so far, implementing a general deterministic policy µ or randomized policy µ˜ in a
realistic setting may appear hopeless, because it involves too many permutations and probabilities. Our goal
in the next section is to characterize optimal policies and show that they have a nice and simple structure,
under certain conditions. In particular, we show that an optimal policy ranks the relevant pages of a request y
by decreasing value of a score defined as ψ(ri)(ri + ρ∗gi), for an appropriate constant ρ∗ ≥ 0 common
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to all items and requests, found by optimization. We will show this property for the general randomized
policies µ˜. This property will imply that for the optimal ρ∗, randomization should be used only to order the
pages having the same score. If the probability of such an equality is zero, then we can have a deterministic
optimal policy. Otherwise, which typically occurs when Y has a discrete distribution, one can add a very
small random perturbation to the revenue values Gi of the pages in Y , so that there is no equality with
probability 1, and the effect of the perturbation can be made arbitrarily small. The optimal policy for the
perturbed model will be a simple rule that can be easily optimized.
3. Optimality Conditions for Ranking Policies
3.1. Reformulation of Randomized Policies
We start by reformulating randomized policies, to facilitate the use of convexity analysis techniques for
characterizing optimal policies. Recall that a randomized policy assigns a probability q(pi, y) to each per-
mutation pi ∈Πm, for each request y. The m! probabilities q(pi, y) determine in turn the probability zi,j(y)
that page i ends up in position j, for each (i, j). This gives an m×m matrix of probabilities zi,j(y)≥ 0, for
1≤ i, j ≤m, for which each row sums to 1 and each column sums to 1 (a doubly stochastic matrix). The
correspondence between those two sets of probabilities is not one to one, because one has m!− 1 degrees
of freedom for choosing µ˜(y) (we subtract 1 because the probabilities must sum to 1), and only (m− 1)2
degrees of freedom for choosing the matrix. However, the expected relevance and revenue for a request y in
our model depend on pi only via r(pi, y) and g(pi, y), which are sums over i in which each term depends only
on the position pi(i). Therefore, r and g in (5) and (6) can be written equivalently by taking the expectation
with respect to the zi,j(y):
r := r(µ˜) =E
[
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
zi,j(Y )ci,j(Y )Ri
]
=E
[
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
zi,j(Y )θjR˜i
]
, (8)
and
g := g(µ˜) =E
[
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
zi,j(Y )ci,j(Y )Gi
]
=E
[
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
zi,j(Y )θjG˜i
]
. (9)
In view of this equivalence, with a slight abuse of notation, we can define a randomized policy µ˜ equiva-
lently as a rule that assigns, for each y ∈Ω, a doubly stochastic probability matrix µ˜(y) =z(y)∈Rm×m. We
adopt this definition for the rest of this paper. Let U˜ be the class of such randomized policies. A determin-
istic policy µ is just a special case of this for which the entries of each matrix are all 0 or 1, with a single 1
in each row and each column (such a matrix defines a permutation). For a given request y and a doubly
stochastic probability matrix z(y), one can generate a random permutation that satisfies these probabilities
by first generating the page at position 1, then for each position j = 2, . . . ,m in succession, select the page
at position j using the conditional probabilities given the selections made at positions before j.
L’Ecuyer et al.: Revenue-Maximizing Rankings
10
The optimization problem for the SE can now be formulated as
(OP) max ϕ(r, g)
subject to (8), (9), and µ˜(y) = z(y) doubly stochastic, for each y ∈Ω.
This large-scale nonlinear optimization problem is not easy to solve directly in this general form, but we can
characterize its optimal solutions via (standard) convexity analysis arguments, as follows. Each randomized
policy µ˜ has a corresponding pair (r, g) = (r(µ˜), g(µ˜)). Let C be the set of all points (r, g) that correspond
to some µ˜∈ U˜ .
LEMMA 1. The set C is a convex set.
PROOF. If the two pairs (r1, g1) and (r2, g2) are in C, they must correspond to two randomized policies µ˜1
and µ˜2 in U˜ . Suppose µ˜1(y) = z1(y) = {z1i,j(y) : 1≤ i, j ≤m} and µ˜2(y) = z2(y) = {z2i,j(y) : 1≤ i, j ≤m}
for each y ∈Ω. For any given α ∈ (0,1), let µ˜= αµ˜1 + (1−α)µ˜2 be the policy defined via µ˜(y) = z(y) =
{zi,j(y) : 1≤ i, j ≤m}where zi,j(y) = αz1i,j(y)+(1−α)z2i,j(y), for all i, j and y ∈Ω. This policy provides
a feasible solution that corresponds to the pair (r, g) = α(r1, g1) + (1−α)(r2, g2), so this pair must belong
to C. 
We emphasize that the decisions variables in OP are not (r, g), but the zi,j(y)’s, whose values define a
policy. We can nevertheless define the two-dimensional auxiliary problem
(OP2) max ϕ(r, g)
subject to (r, g)∈ C,
whose optimal solutions correspond to optimal policies for OP. Suppose (r∗, g∗) is an optimal solution to
OP2, which means it is a pair (r, g) ∈ C that corresponds to an optimal policy for OP, with optimal value
ϕ∗ = ϕ(r∗, g∗). We know that such an optimal solution always exists, because C is closed and bounded
and ϕ is continuous and bounded. Given that C is convex and ϕ(r, g) is increasing in both r and g, one
must have (r− r∗, g− g∗) · ∇ϕ(r∗, g∗)≤ 0 for all (r, g) ∈ C. Therefore, (r, g) = (r∗, g∗) remains an opti-
mal solution to the modified problem if we replace ϕ(r, g) in OP2 by the linear function (r − r∗, g −
g∗) · ∇ϕ(r∗, g∗), or equivalently by ϕr(r∗, g∗)r+ϕg(r∗, g∗)g. If we define h(r, g) =ϕg(r, g)/ϕr(r, g) and
ρ∗ = h(r∗, g∗), and we divide by ϕr(r∗, g∗), we can rewrite the last problem as r + ρ∗g (in which ρ∗ is
viewed as a constant). With our specific objective function ϕ(r, g) = λ(r)(β+g), we have ρ∗ = h(r∗, g∗) =
λ(r∗)/((β+ g∗)λ′(r∗)). These arguments are summarized by the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. If we replace the objective ϕ(r, g) by the linear function r+ ρ∗g in the problem OP2,
the point (r∗, g∗) still corresponds to an optimal solution to the modified problem. Notice that ρ∗ is a
constant in this formulation.
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The converse may not be true: an optimal solution (r, g) to the modified problem (with linear objective)
is not necessarily optimal for OP2. However, if the modified problem has a unique optimal solution, then
it must be optimal for OP2 as well. This happens if and only if the line (r − r∗, g − g∗) · ∇ϕ(r∗, g∗) = 0
intersects C only at (r∗, g∗).
An optimal solution (r∗, g∗) for OP2, as well as ρ∗, are also not necessarily unique in general. For
example, multiple optimal solutions would occur if ϕ(r, g) is constant along one segment of the boundary
of C (a finite curve) and the optimum is reached on that segment. Then, any point (r∗, g∗) on that segment,
with the corresponding ρ∗, would satisfy the proposition. For a sufficient condition for uniqueness, consider
the contour curve defined by ϕ(r, g) = ϕ∗ in the r-g plane. If this contour curve represents the graph of
g as a strictly convex function of r, then (r∗, g∗) and ρ∗ must be unique, because the set C is convex. For
ϕ(r, g) = λ(r)(β + g), if λ(r) = rα with α > 0, for example, then the contour curve obeys the equation
g = g(r) = ϕ∗r−α − β. Differentiating twice, we find that g′′(r) = ϕ∗α(α+ 1)r−α−2 > 0, so the contour
curve represents a strictly convex function of r for 0< r≤ 1, and the solution is unique.
Proposition 1 does not yet tell us the form of an optimal policy. We will now build on it to provide a
characterization of these optimal solutions to OP.
3.2. Necessary Optimality Conditions Under a Discrete Distribution for Y
Here we consider the situation in which Y has a discrete distribution over a finite set Ω, with p(y) = P[Y =
y] for all y = (m,r1, g1, . . . , rm, gm) ∈ Ω. In this case, the optimization problem OP can be rewritten in
terms of a finite number of decision variables, as follows:
(OP-D) maxϕ(r, g)
subject to r=
∑
y∈Ω
p(y)
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
zi,j(y)θj r˜i
g=
∑
y∈Ω
p(y)
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
zi,j(y)θj g˜i
M∑
j=1
zi,j(y) =
M∑
i=1
zi,j(y) = 1 for all y ∈Ω, 1≤ i, j ≤M
0≤ zi,j(y)≤ 1 for all y ∈Ω, 1≤ i, j ≤M
in which the zi,j(y) are the decision variables. Since Ω is typically very large, this is in general a hard-to-
solve large-scale nonlinear optimization problem.
Suppose that the current solution µ˜ is optimal for the linear objective r+ ρg for a given ρ > 0. Then we
should not be able to increase r+ ρg by changing the probabilities zi,j(y) in this optimal solution, for any
given request y with p(y)> 0. In particular, if δ := min(zi,j(y), zi′,j′(y))> 0, decreasing those two prob-
abilities by δ and increasing the two probabilities zi,j′(y) and zi′,j(y) by δ gives another feasible solution
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(or policy) µ˜′. In view of the expressions for r and g in problem OP-D, we find that this probability swap
would change r and g by ∆r = δp(y)(θj′ − θj)(r˜i− r˜i′) and ∆g = δp(y)(θj′ − θj)(g˜i− g˜i′), respectively.
Since the current solution is optimal for the objective r+ ρg, it cannot increase this objective, so we must
have ∆r+ ρ∆g≤ 0. This translates into the conditions
(θj′ − θj) [(r˜i− r˜i′) + ρ(g˜i− g˜i′)]≤ 0 (10)
whenever min(zi,j(y), zi′,j′(y))> 0, for all i, j, i′, j′, y with p(y)> 0. Without loss of generality, suppose
that j′ > j, so we know that θj′ ≤ θj . If θj′ = θj , the condition is always trivially satisfied. If θj′ < θj , one
must have
r˜i + ρg˜i ≥ r˜i′ + ρg˜i′ . (11)
That is, if there is a positive probability that page i is ranked at a strictly better position j than the position
j′ of page i′, then Condition (11) must hold. The following proposition restates this in words.
PROPOSITION 2. Any optimal randomized policy must rank the pages by decreasing order of their score
r˜i + ρg˜i whenever p(y)> 0, for some constant ρ > 0 common to all the requests, with the exception that if
θj′ = θj , the order between pages at positions j and j′ can be arbitrary.
We call a ranking policy that satisfies this condition for a given ρ > 0 a linear ordering (LO) policy with
ratio ρ (or LO-ρ policy, for short). When ρ = 0, the ordering is based only on r˜i, whereas in the limit as
ρ→∞, the ordering is based only on g˜i.
We emphasize that finding an optimal ρ might not be enough to specify an optimal policy in the case
where, with positive probability, two or more pages have the same score R˜i + ρG˜i. If the way we order
those pages when this happens would not matter, then we could obtain an optimal deterministic ranking
policy simply by choosing an arbitrary deterministic rule to order the pages having the same score. Given ρ,
this would be very easy to implement, just by sorting the m matching pages by decreasing order of their
score, for each y. However, the ordering in case of equality does matter, as illustrated by the following tiny
example.
EXAMPLE 1. We consider an instance with a unique request type and two matching pages, Y = y =
(m,r1, g1, r2, g2) = (2,1,0,1/5,2) with probability 1. We take ψ(ri) = 1 for all ri, λ(r) = r, (θ1, θ2) =
(1,1/2), and ϕ(r, g) = r(1 + g). At each request we select a ranking, either (1,2) or (2,1). With a random-
ized policy, we select (1,2) with probability z1,1(y) = p and (2,1) with probability 1− p. In this simple
case, one can write r, g, and ϕ(r, g) as functions of p, and optimize. We have
r = p(θ1r1 + θ2r2) + (1− p)(θ1r2 + θ2r1) = (7 + 4p)/10,
g = p(θ1g1 + θ2g2) + (1− p)(θ1g2 + θ2g1) = 2− p,
ϕ(r, g) = r(1 + g) = (7 + 4p)(3− p)/10 = (21 + 5p− 4p2)/10.
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Figure 1 The reachable pairs (r, g) for Example 1 (black line), a level curve of the objective (in red) and the
optimal pair (r∗, g∗).
This objective function is quadratic and has its maximum at p∗ = 5/8. Evaluating, we obtain r∗ = 19/20,
g∗ = 11/8, and ϕ(r∗, g∗) = 361/160. Note that by taking p = 0 we get (r, g) = (7/10,2) and ϕ(r, g) =
21/10 = 336/160, whereas by taking p = 1 we get (r, g) = (11/10,1) and ϕ(r, g) = 22/10 = 352/160.
Thus, the optimal randomized policy does strictly better than any deterministic one. The feasible set C here
is the line segment that goes from (7/10,2) to (11/10,1). See Figure 1.
With the optimal p∗ = 5/8, we also obtain ρ∗ = r∗/(1 + g∗) = 2/5, and it turns out that r˜1 + ρ∗g˜1 =
r˜2 + ρ
∗g˜2 = 1. Thus, any ordering (and any randomized policy) satisfies the LO-ρ∗ rule! That is, in this
simple example, the LO-ρ∗ rule (and knowing ρ∗) tells us nothing about the optimal policy. Note that the
entire segment C belongs to the line r + ρ∗g = 1, so maximizing the linear objective is not sufficient to
obtain an optimal solution. 
3.3. A Model With a Continuous Distribution for Y
In this section, we extend the discussion to a model in which the requests Y have a continuous distribution
over Ω⊆ ∪m0m=1 ({m} × ([0,1]× [0,K])m). The goal is to have a model for which ρ∗ is unique and not
difficult to compute or estimate, and for which knowing ρ∗ is sufficient to specify an optimal policy. This
type of continuous model can be used as an approximation to a model with discrete distribution. We will
show that the approximation error can be made arbitrarily small.
We suppose that Ω is a measurable set and that Y has a probability measure ν over the class B of
Borel subsets of Ω, so that ν({y}) = 0 for all y ∈ Ω and ν(B) = ∫
B
dν(y) for each B ∈ B. Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1 still apply in this case. However, the argument that led to Proposition 2 in the discrete case no
longer applies, because each y has probability 0. We modify this argument to prove a similar result for the
continuous case. We first adapt the notion of LO-ρ policy to this setting, and we establish that any optimal
randomized policy must be of that form. In the continuous case, a randomized policy µ˜ is called an LO-ρ
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policy if for almost all Y (with respect to the measure ν), µ˜ sorts the pages by decreasing order of R˜i+ρG˜i,
except perhaps at positions j and j′ where θj = θj′ , at which the order can be arbitrary. That is, if page i is
at position j, page i′ is at position j′, and θj > θj′ , then one must have R˜i + ρG˜i ≥ R˜j + ρG˜j .
PROPOSITION 3. If the tuple (r∗, g∗) corresponds to an optimal policy, then this policy must be an LO-ρ
policy with ρ= ρ∗ = h(r∗, g∗).
PROOF. Let µ˜ be an optimal randomized policy, with its corresponding values of r∗ and g∗, and let B ∈ B
be a set with ν(B) > 0 such that δ := infy∈B min(zi,j(y), zi′,j′(y)) > 0 for some arbitrary pages i 6= i′
and positions j 6= j′, for this policy µ˜. Suppose we change µ˜ into µ˜′ by decreasing the probabilities zi,j(y)
and zi′,j′(y) by δ, and increasing zi,j′(y) and zi′,j(y) by δ, for all y ∈ B. This gives another admissible
randomized policy. The changes on r and g coming from this probability switch are
∆r = δ
∫
B
(θj′ − θj)(r˜i− r˜i′)dν(y),
∆g = δ
∫
B
(θj′ − θj)(g˜i− g˜i′)dν(y),
and we must have
0≥∆r+ ρ∆g= (θj′ − θj)δ
∫
B
[(r˜i− r˜i′) + ρ(g˜i− g˜i′)]dν(y). (12)
Now take j′ > j such that θj−θj′ > 0. Suppose that there exists  > 0, δ > 0, andB ∈B such that ν(B)> 0,
for which for all y ∈B,
r˜i + ρ
∗g˜i ≤ r˜i′ + ρ∗g˜i′ −  (13)
and min(zi,j(y), zi′,j′(y)) ≥ δ under policy µ˜. That is, there is a set of positive probability on which the
two pages i and i′ are not placed by decreasing order of R˜i + ρG˜i. We can modify policy µ˜ to a policy µ˜′
that first orders the pages according to policy µ˜, and then if y ∈B, page i is at position j, and page i′ is at
position j′, the pages i and i′ are swapped positions. This swapping occurs with probability at least ν(B)δ2,
and when it occurs it improves
(θj′ − θj) [(r˜i− r˜i′) + ρ∗(g˜i− g˜i′)] (14)
by at least (θj′ − θj). The modification therefore improves the linear objective r + ρ∗g by at least
ν(B)δ2(θj′ − θj) > 0, which contradicts the assumption that µ˜ is optimal. 
Proposition 3 tells us that any optimal policy must satisfy the LO-ρ conditions for ρ= ρ∗. But we need
an additional assumption to make sure that knowing ρ∗ and using an LO-ρ∗ rule is sufficient to completely
specify an optimal policy. For the remainder, we make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION B. For any ρ≥ 0, and any j > i > 0, P[M ≥ j and R˜i + ρG˜i = R˜j + ρG˜j] = 0. 
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Under Assumption B, for any fixed ρ ≥ 0, a deterministic LO-ρ policy µ = µ(ρ) provides a unique
ranking of the pages with probability 1, i.e., for almost any Y ∈ Ω. If ρ = ρ∗ = h(r∗, g∗) for an optimal
solution (r∗, g∗), such a deterministic LO-ρ∗ policy is optimal. We also know that there always exists such
an optimal (r∗, g∗), because C is closed and bounded. An LO-ρ policy µ= µ(ρ) has corresponding values
of (r, g) = (r(µ), g(µ)) and of h(r, g) that are uniquely defined. To refer to h(r, g) as a function of ρ, we
write h˜(ρ) := h(r(µ(ρ)), g(µ(ρ))). From Proposition 3, any optimal policy µ must be an LO-ρ policy with
ρ= ρ∗ = h(r(µ(ρ∗)), g(µ(ρ∗))) = h˜(ρ∗). Since an optimal policy is known to exist, the fixed-point equation
h˜(ρ) = ρ (15)
has at least one solution ρ∗ ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, if h˜′(ρ) < 1 for all ρ > 0, then the function h˜(ρ) cannot
cross the line f(ρ) = ρ more than once, and the fixed point must be unique. In particular, if λ(r)/λ′(r)
is non-decreasing in r, then it is non-increasing in ρ because r(µ(ρ)) is non-increasing in ρ. Additionally,
since we know that g(µ(ρ)) is non-decreasing in ρ, it follows that h˜(ρ) is non-increasing in ρ, so h˜′(ρ)≤ 0
and the fixed point must be unique. This condition that λ(r)/λ′(r) is non-decreasing is clearly stronger than
what we need to guarantee uniqueness of the root, but it is quite reasonable. To illustrate when this condition
is satisfied, take λ(r) = a0 + b0 ln(c0 + r) for some constants a0 ≥ 0, b0 > 0, and c0 ≥ 1. Then, λ′(r) =
b0/(c0 + r), and therefore λ(r)/λ′(r) = [a0 + b0 ln(c0 + r)](c0 + r)/b0, which is bounded and increasing
in r ∈ [0,m0]. Other simple cases where this condition holds are the monomial forms λ(r) = a0rb0 for any
positive values a0 and b0; which includes the case λ(r) = r considered in some examples in this paper.
When Gi = 0 for all i, or G˜i is equal to the same constant for all i, the choice of ρ does not matter, and
the pages are always sorted by decreasing order of R˜i. If we assume that ψ(ri) is a non-decreasing function
of ri, which is natural, the pages should always be sorted by order of relevance Ri; i.e., the SE has the
incentive to conform to search neutrality. Under this ordering, r takes its maximal possible value r0 ≤m0.
We always have r ∈ [0, r0].
We now provide examples showing why we need Assumption B. In particular, having a density for Y is
not sufficient for the optimal policy to be deterministic and uniquely defined by ρ∗.
EXAMPLE 2. Starting from Example 1, we add a third page with relevanceR3 uniformly distributed over
[0, ] for some small  > 0, and revenue G3 = 0. We assume that θ3 = 1/4. Since R3 has a density, p(y) = 0
for all y ∈Ω. For any ρ > 0, if  is small enough, this third page will always be ranked last, and its impact
on h(r, g) is very small. Then the problem of ranking the first two pages becomes the same as Example 1,
so the optimal policy must be randomized. 
One might think that if no R˜i or G˜i has a probability mass at a given point, then Assumption B must hold,
but this is also not sufficient, because (unless we assume independence) one may construct an example in
which with positive probability, one has R˜i = R˜j and G˜i = G˜j and then R˜i + ρG˜i = R˜j + ρG˜j .
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3.4. Continuous Approximation to the Discrete Case
The continuous model under Assumption B has an important advantage over a discrete model, in terms of
the simplicity of an optimal policy. This motivates the idea that when Y has a discrete distribution, instead
of solving OP-D, we can approximate the distribution by a continuous one by adding a random perturbation
to each Gi for each Y . The perturbations are all independent and uniform over the interval (−, ) for a
very small . The perturbed model then satisfies Assumption B, and it suffices to compute ρ∗(), an optimal
ρ for this perturbed problem, to obtain an optimal LO-ρ ranking policy for it. Let r∗() = r(ρ∗()) and
g∗() = g(ρ∗()) be the average relevance and gain when using the optimal policy on the perturbed problem.
The next proposition compares the optimal values of the original and perturbed problems, and shows that
by taking  small enough, an optimal policy for the perturbed problem will be ′-optimal for the original
problem for an arbitrarily small ′. Let ϕ∗ and ϕ∗() be the optimal values of the original and perturbed
problem, and let ϕ∗∗() =ϕ(r∗(), g∗()) be the value of using the LO-ρ∗() policy on the original problem.
What we lose (per unit of time) by using this policy instead of an optimal one for the original problem is
ϕ∗−ϕ∗∗(), which is shown to be bounded in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. We have
0≤ϕ∗−ϕ∗∗()≤ϕ∗()−ϕ∗∗()≤ ′ := λ(r∗())(θ1 + · · ·+ θm0). (16)
PROOF. For the original problem, applying the LO-ρ∗() policy cannot do better than the optimal policy.
This gives ϕ∗∗()≤ ϕ∗. For the perturbed problem, imagine that Gi is observed both before and after the
perturbation, so we can apply an optimal randomized policy µ˜ for the original problem to the perturbed
problem by ignoring the realized perturbation before making the decision. This would give the same pair
(r(µ˜), g(µ˜)) and the same value ϕ∗ as for the original problem, because the expected value of the pertur-
bation is zero, so adding it does not change g. But this policy ignores some relevant information that is
available in the perturbed problem, namely the perturbed Gi’s, which are the relevant values for the per-
turbed problem. Therefore it cannot beat an optimal policy for the perturbed problem, i.e., we must have
ϕ∗ ≤ϕ∗(). To show the last inequality in (16), note that, following the same method, if we take the rankings
(randomized or not) obtained by the LO-ρ∗() policy run on the original requests, and apply them to both
the original and the perturbed problems, the values of r and λ(r) are the same in both cases, and the differ-
ence in g cannot exceed (θ1 + · · ·+θm0). Therefore the difference ϕ∗()−ϕ∗∗() in ϕ(r, g) = λ(r)(β+g)
cannot exceed λ(r)(θ1 + · · ·+ θm0). 
Since λ is a bounded function, (16) shows that by using an LO-ρ∗() policy instead of an optimal policy
for the original problem, the loss in value isO(), and can be made negligible by taking  sufficiently small.
In practice, one can estimate ρ∗() for a very small , such as 10−10 for example. When implementing the
policy, for each request Y , one would add the random perturbations and use the perturbed values to rank
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Table 1 Optimal values for Example 3 as a function of .
 p∗() ρ∗() r∗() g∗() ϕ∗() ϕ∗∗()
0.0 0.625 0.4 0.95 1.375 2.25625 2.25625
0.001 0.62491 0.39995 0.94996 1.37521 2.25636 2.256155
0.01 0.62411 0.39950 0.94964 1.37006 2.25736 2.255395
0.1 0.61705 0.39537 0.94682 1.39476 2.26741 2.2486975
0.5 0.59771 0.38137 0.93908 1.46240 2.31240 2.230315
the pages. In fact, it would also suffice to generate the perturbations only for the pages for which there is an
equality.
As an illustration, we apply this perturbation method to Example 1. In fact, we will add a perturbation
only to G2, since it is sufficient for eliminating equalities.
EXAMPLE 3. In Example 1, suppose now that G2 has the uniform distribution over the interval (2 −
,2 + ). The expectation of G2 is unchanged, but now we obtain slightly more accurate information on the
revenue G2 before making the ranking decision. This modified (perturbed) model satisfies Assumption B,
so finding ρ∗() is sufficient to completely specify an optimal policy for the perturbed model. Since the
perturbed G2 is observed before making the ranking decision and can be used for making the decision, we
expect that ϕ∗()−ϕ∗ > 0 and increases with . It also converges to 0 when → 0. Figure 2 confirms this.
For the perturbed model, we can write G2 = 2 + (2V − 1) where V ∼ U(0,1). An LO-ρ policy then
selects the order (1,2) if and only if R1 +ρG1 >R2 +ρG2, if and only if V < p= p() := 2/(5ρ)−1/+
1/2, which occurs with probability p. We have r= (7 + 4p)/10 as before and
g = 2− p+ 
∫ p
0
(v− 1/2)dv+ 
∫ 1
p
(2v− 1)dv = 2− p+ p(1− p)/2,
ϕ(r, g) = r(1 + g) =
7 + 4p
10
(3− p+ p(1− p)/2),
∂
∂p
ϕ(r, g) = [5− 8p+ (7/2− 3p(1 + 2p))]/10.
We can find the optimal p, say p∗ = p∗(), as a root of this equation and we have
ρ= ρ(p) =
2
5(1 + (p− 1/2))
from the definition of p. We see that when → 0, p∗ = p∗()→ 5/8 = 0.625 and ρ∗()→ 2/5 = 0.4. Table 1
gives the optimal values as a function of . It shows how ρ∗() and ϕ∗() converge to ρ∗ and ϕ∗ when → 0.
Figure 2 pictures the reachable values of (r, g) for this example, for some large values of . The upper
curve (in red) represents the pairs (r, g) for LO-ρ policies for all values of ρ ∈ [0,∞] (or 0 ≤ p ≤ 1), for
= 0.5. The optimal point (r∗, g∗) is shown by an x in red. The corresponding curve and point for = 0.1
are in green (the middle curve). The lower line (a straight line) represents the pairs (r, g) for the policies
that select the ranking (1,2) with probability p independently of G2. Those are the randomized policies of
Example 1. For any given , the region delimited by the lower line and the curve is the set C.
L’Ecuyer et al.: Revenue-Maximizing Rankings
18
0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
ϕ(r, g) =ϕ∗(0.5)
•(r∗, g∗)
•
•
• = 0.5• = 0.1
r
g
Figure 2 The upper boundary of C and the optimal solution with an LO-ρ policy for  = 0.5 (blue line) and
= 0.1 (green line) for the perturbed problem in Example 3
3.5. Computing or Estimating ρ∗
We now discuss how to compute ρ∗, an optimal ρ for an LO-ρ policy, under Assumption B. We saw that
the optimal ρ can be written as a function of r and g, which in turn depend on the selected policy µ and
are unknown a priori. In the previous small examples, were able to derive explicit analytical expressions for
r(ρ) and g(ρ), and use them to find the optimal ρ. Unfortunately, instances of real size do not admit such
closed-form derivations and they would usually have to be estimated through simulation. Then the search
for ρ∗ is a stochastic root-finding problem: estimate a root of h˜(ρ)− ρ= 0 when only noisy estimates of h˜
can be obtained, via simulation. Several algorithms have been designed and studied for this type of problem.
Two prominent classes of approaches are sample average optimization and stochastic approximation; see,
e.g., Pasupathy and Kim (2011) and the references therein. These methods generally assume that a root
exists and is unique, which is typically the case (we gave conditions for that earlier). If h˜ is a contraction
mapping, we can apply a different method which we now describe. It is very simple, easy to implement, and
has worked very nicely in all the examples we tried (including all the numerical examples in this paper). It
requires an estimator of h˜(ρ).
We can define and compute an estimator hˆn(ρ) of h˜(ρ) at any given value of ρ as follows. We generate
n independent realizations Y1, . . . , Yn of Y , with Yk = (Mk,Rk,1,Gk,1, . . . ,Rk,Mk ,Gk,Mk). For each k,
we order the Mk pairs (Rk,i,Gk,i) by decreasing order of R˜k,i + ρG˜k,i, and let pik be the corresponding
permutation. We then compute the following unbiased estimators of r(ρ) and g(ρ):
rˆn(ρ) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
Mk∑
i=1
θpik(i)R˜k,i and gˆn(ρ) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
Mk∑
i=1
θpik(i)G˜k,i.
They lead to the estimator
hˆn(ρ) =ϕ(rˆn(ρ), gˆn(ρ)) = λ(rˆn(ρ))(β+ gˆn(ρ)), (17)
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which is biased because ϕ is nonlinear, but is consistent. The bias decreases as O(1/n) and a confidence
interval for h˜(ρ) can be computed via the Delta method; see Asmussen and Glynn (2007).
Recall that ρ→ h˜(ρ) is a contraction mapping if there is a constant γ ∈ [0,1) such that |h˜(ρ)− h˜(ρ′)| ≤
γ|ρ − ρ′| for all ρ, ρ′ ≥ 0. A sufficient condition for this is that |h˜′(ρ)| ≤ γ for all ρ (in the region of
interest). It is very common in our setting that ρ→ h˜(ρ) is a contraction mapping. In particular, it is true
in all the examples considered in this paper. When this holds, we can start from some ρ0 > 0 and iterate:
ρj = h˜(ρj−1), for j = 1,2, . . . . Then, the fixed-point theorem for contraction mappings (Bertsekas and
Shreve 1978) guarantees that ρj→ ρ∗ at a geometric rate: |ρj − ρ∗| ≤ γj|ρ0− ρ∗|, which provides very fast
convergence when γ 1. In practice, we can replace h˜(ρj) by hˆnj (ρj), and convergence to ρ∗ will occur if
nj→∞ when j→∞. Note that if nj does not increase with j, ρj will generally not converge to ρ∗. If nj is
fixed to some large constant n and we use independent random numbers (IRN) across the different steps j
for the simulations, ρj will never converge but will wander around in a small neighborhood of ρ∗. If we use
common random numbers (CRN) for the simulations (i.e., exactly the same n realizations Yk at all steps j),
it will converge to a value close to ρ∗, but generally different.
4. Some Illustrative Examples
This section introduces some examples that, although very simple and stylized, capture some real world
concerns and illustrate our method. To simplify the exposition, our examples assume that ψ(Ri) = 1, which
means that the CRT is ci,j(y) = θj and depends only on the position of the page. We take λ(r) = r, so
λ(r)/λ′(r) = r is non-decreasing and h˜(ρ) = ρ always has a unique fixed point ρ∗. Assumption B is also
satisfied in all our examples, so ρ∗ always defines the order uniquely with probability 1. These assumptions
are by no means necessary or realistic, but they simplify the exposition. Example 4 illustrates how to apply
the methodology in a simple case, while Example 5 shows how a regulator could evaluate if regulations are
beneficial by estimating the economic consequences of revenue-maximizing ranking strategies, in terms of
fairness among content providers (the search neutrality debate). Overall, we provide a methodology to help
decision making on behalf of regulators.
4.1. Computing the optimal ranking: an illustrative example
This example shows the results of applying the framework put forward in this paper to an instance inspired
by a platform that has the choice of showing own or third-party results for which its own content generates
profits while the external content does not. The example illustrates de tradeoffs in terms of total revenue,
relevance and short-term gains when one transitions from a relevance-based ranking into a profit-based
ranking. The final outcome is the coefficient ρ∗ that resolves that tradeoff, which can be used to rank the
results optimally.
EXAMPLE 4. This example depicts a situation in which the SE has a positive expected revenue Gi for a
page for which it is also the CP, and Gi = 0 otherwise. An alternative interpretation is that all the content
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Table 2 Values of ρj at the first six iterations of the contraction mapping for Example 4, with IRN and CRN
Method ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5 ρ6
IRN 0.4444471 0.377720 0.387115 0.3857771 0.3860725 0.3859246
CRN 0.4444471 0.377670 0.387079 0.3857318 0.3859223 0.3858940
is served by other CPs, and some of those CPs agree to pay the SE a fixed price, normalized to 1, for each
click to their pages served from the SE’s output. This price does not depend on the ranking of the link; it
just gives an incentive for the SE to favor links with Gi = 1 in its ranking.
Suppose there are two matching pages (M = 2). For i= 1,2,Ri has a uniform distribution over [0,1], the
revenue Gi is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p= P[Gi = 1] = 1− P[Gi = 0], and these four
random variables are independent. The density of Y is a mixture of two uniform densities, and Assump-
tion B holds. Let (θ1, θ2) = (1,0), which amounts to assuming that the SE displays only one page. Focusing
on LO-ρ policies, we derive explicit formulas for r= r(ρ), g= g(ρ), and ϕ(r(ρ), g(ρ)). The fixed point ρ∗
can then be computed from these formulas.
Considering the four possible realizations of (G1,G2) and taking expectations, we obtain r = r(ρ) =
2/3 +p(1−p)ρ¯2 (2ρ¯/3− 1) and g= g(ρ) = p2 +p(1−p) (1− (2− ρ¯)2) , where ρ¯ := min(1, ρ). Both r(ρ)
and g(ρ) are constant for ρ≥ 1, so we can restrict the search for ρ∗ to the interval [0,1], and we have ρ¯= ρ
in that interval. With λ(r) = r, the expected revenue per unit of time is ϕ(r(ρ), g(ρ)) = r(ρ)(β + g(ρ)) =
(2/3 + p(1− p)ρ2 (2ρ/3− 1)) (β+ (p2 + p(1− p) (2− (1− ρ)2))) . Figure 3 depicts the expected revenue
as a function of ρ, along with r(ρ) and g(ρ), for β = 1 and p= 1/2. While g(ρ) increases and r(ρ) decreases
with ρ, the maximal revenue is obtained by taking ρ around 0.4. This optimal ρ uniquely determines the
optimal policy (with probability 1).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.8
1
ρ
Revenue ϕ(r(ρ), g(ρ))
Relevance r(ρ)
Gain g(ρ)
Figure 3 Expected SE revenue per unit time for β = 1 and p= 1/2
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For this example, with the expressions previously derived for r and g, we get
h˜(ρ) =
2/3 + p(1− p)ρ¯2(2ρ¯/3− 1)
β+ p2 + 2p(1− p)(1− (1− ρ¯)2/2)
and
h˜′(ρ) =−2
3
p(1− p)(1− ρ¯)(3ρ¯β+ 3pρ¯+ 3pρ¯
2− pρ¯3− 3p2ρ¯2 + p2ρ¯3 + 2)
(β+ p+ 2pρ¯− pρ¯2− 2p2ρ¯+ p2ρ¯2)2 .
For β = 1 and p = 1/2, one can verify numerically that for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, h˜′(ρ) is negative and achieves
a maximum absolute value of approximately 0.15 < 1 (although the derivative is not monotone). Hence,
ρj → h˜(ρj) is a contraction mapping with γ ≈ 0.15 in that area. We applied this contraction mapping for
six iterations, starting with ρ0 = 0, with a fixed sample size of nj = 107 for all j. We did this with both IRN
and CRN. The results are in Table 2. In both cases, ρj provides a good approximation to ρ∗ very quickly.
We find that ρ∗ ≈ 0.3859.
4.2. Applying the methodology to study the impact of non-neutral search engines
The next example illustrates how our method could help answer specific questions about whether regulations
are beneficial or not. The framework we introduced can indeed be of high interest to regulators who study the
impact of search neutrality on users and on overall social welfare. It can help them determine if intervention
is warranted, study the consequences of doing so, and provide arguments for or against non-neutral SEs by
computing welfare measures of all parties involved in the interaction with the platform.
These questions were discussed by the Federal Trade Commission in the US (Brill 2013) and in a Senate
hearing (Rushe 2012). Search biases have been amply documented in experiments (Edelman and Lockwood
2011, Wright 2012, Maille´ and Tuffin 2014). Data indicate that a search for a video in Google is likely
to generate more organic links to YouTube pages, which contain ads that directly benefit Google, than in
another SE. Since videos in competitors’ platforms do not generate additional revenue, Google has a finan-
cial interest for the user to click on YouTube content. Similarly, Google’s expected revenue may increase if
a link to a Google map is included in the output instead of a link to MapQuest, Yahoo Maps, Bing Maps, etc.
The debate about whether SEs should be regulated or not has ignited public interest (Crowcroft 2007, Inria
2012). A neutral SE should only use relevance to construct its rankings, and ignore revenues. This would
allow new entrants that perform well (i.e., that are commonly clicked) to be listed near the top of the list of
organic search results. The risk of a non-neutral ranking is that it may slow down innovation by favoring
the incumbents that are known to generate profits, thereby preventing new applications/content from being
shown, and hence to become known and successful.
EXAMPLE 5. A Vertically Integrated SE with a CP. Here we focus on a specific type of request which
can be served by either third-party CPs or by the SE itself. Assume that a limited number of CPs compete
with the SE, and that the parameters r, g, and λ(r) for the instance correspond to just this type of request.
We assume that each request has M = 10 matching pages, that one of them (say Page 1) is served directly
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Table 3 CTR values θj used in Example 5
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8 θ9 θ10
0.364 0.125 0.095 0.079 0.061 0.041 0.038 0.035 0.03 0.022
by the SE, while the other nine are served by third-party CPs. In addition to the revenue coming from
Page 1, the SE receives an expected revenue of β = 1 per request from sponsored links in the results
page. We assume that R1, . . . ,R10,G1 are independent random variables, all uniformly distributed over
(0,1), whereas G2 = · · · = G10 = 0. The CTRs θj , in Table 3, are proportional to the observed relative
numbers of clicks as a function of position j, given in the first table of Dejarnette (2012). The multiplicative
proportionality constant has no impact on our derivations, so we take it equal to 1. Each third-party CP
also receives an expected revenue Ci, for i = 2, . . . ,10, where the Ci are independent and uniform over
(0,1). Those Ci have no impact on the optimization; they would be used to estimate the impact of various
strategies on the CP revenues.
The M = 10 pages are ranked by the SE by decreasing value of R˜i + ρG˜i, for some ρ ≥ 0. Figure 4
shows the SE revenue, the relevance r(ρ), the revenue and the visit rate for CP 1 and for each other (third-
party) CP, all as a function of ρ. The revenues are per unit of time. When ρ increases, the SE favors CP 1
more, which decreases the overall relevance and increases the visit rate to CP 1. The optimal tradeoff for
the SE is attained with ρ∗ ≈ 0.55. The ranking bias from choosing ρ > 0 only affects Page 1. The relative
positions of the other pages remain the same as in the neutral ranking. Consequently, the relevance r(ρ) is
only marginally affected by ρ in this case. If R1 was stochastically much smaller than the other Ri’s (e.g.,
uniform over [0, ] for a small ), then the impact of ρ on r would be larger. When ρ→∞, Page 1 is always
ranked first, and the relevance r(ρ) becomes
r(∞) =
(
θ1
2
+
9∑
i=1
θi+1E[U(10−i)]
)
=
θ1
2
+
9∑
i=1
θi+1
(10− i)
10
≈ 0.517,
where U(1), . . . ,U(9) are independent random variables uniformly distributed over [0,1] sorted by increasing
order (the order statistics), and the visit rate to Page 1 is θ1r(∞)≈ 0.188.
To assess the sensitivity of the SE strategy to advertising, we now examine how the results depend on β.
This shows the tradeoff that the SE faces for different types of requests. For requests related to, e.g., airline
tickets, hotel reservations, or retailer products, the SE could make more profit by showing its own content
among organic links rather than through sponsored search, because requests of this kind may produce
conversions, whereas for requests that are appealing in the sponsored search market, the SE may try to
offer the most relevant links, to boost that revenue stream. Figure 5(a) plots ρ∗ as a function of β, while
Figure 5(b) plots the ensuing revenue for CP 1 and for each third-party CP. Those functions were estimated
by simulation, using the iterative fixed-point method to find ρ∗, with a fixed sample size of n= 107 at each
step. When β grows, ρ∗ tends to zero, because the revenue from sponsored links dominates, making it more
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Figure 4 Performance measures as a function of ρ (simulation results)
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Figure 5 Optimal ρ for the ranking, and CP revenue per unit of time, as functions of β (from simulation)
rewarding for the SE to improve its reputation to attract more users. The impact of non-neutrality is small
in this example because biasing the ranking only attracts limited additional revenue. When β is small, in
contrast, sponsored links do not pay much and it becomes worthwhile for the SE to sacrifice relevance to
some extent for immediate profits. In the extreme case when β = 0, we have ρ∗ =∞, so Page 1 is always
placed at the top, and the other pages are sorted by decreasing order of relevance. This gives an average
revenue of 0.09619 for CP 1 and of 0.01695 for each other CP. Although not shown in the figure, the
expected SE revenue ϕ(r∗, g∗) grow almost linearly with β, which means that the increasing revenues of
sponsored search dominate the additional revenue to the SE coming from Page 1.
To illustrate the impact of non-neutrality, Table 4 reports the variations of the most relevant performance
metrics when using ρ= ρ∗ instead of ρ= 0 (neutral ranking), for different values of β. For our parameters,
we see that while the variation of the perceived quality (relevance) remains small (around 10%), the impact
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Table 4 Impacts of a non-neutral ranking in Example 5
CP 1 other CP CP 1 other CP
Relevance revenue revenue visit rate visit rate
Neutral, ρ= 0
(reference case
optimal for β =∞)
0.635 0.028 0.0283 0.057 0.057
Non-neutral, ρ= 0.559 0.618 0.066 0.0243 0.112 0.049
(optimal for β = 1) (-3%) (+136%) (-14%) (+96%) (-14%)
Non-neutral, ρ= 0.924 0.592 0.084 0.0215 0.140 0.043
(optimal for β = .5) (-7%) (+200%) (-24%) (+146%) (-25%)
Non-neutral, ρ= 1.374 0.568 0.093 0.0193 0.158 0.039
(optimal for β = .25) (-11%) (+232%) (-32%) (+177%) (-32%)
on the visibility and the revenues of the SE-owned CP is substantial: by being non-neutral, the SE can
multiply the revenues of its CP by a factor of 2.8 and its visit rate by a factor larger than 3. On the other
hand, the other CPs see their revenues and visit rates reduced by 14% to 32%, a significant decrease that may
impact their long-term profitability. Of course, the results may be different with real data, but the framework
and method can be applied similarly and can be used to study the impact of different types of regulations
and optimization strategies on the various actors and on public welfare.
5. Conclusion
We have introduced a new modeling framework that allows online platforms to rank items in a way that
maximizes long-term revenues. The long-term impact is captured by the arrival rate of requests, which is an
increasing function of the average relevance of the displayed clicked by the users. We proved that although
we have to choose an ordering among a large number of possibilities for each request and the objective
function is nonlinear, an optimal ranking must satisfy some simple conditions: the items must be sorted by
order of a score defined as a simple function of the (expected) relevance and short-term profits. This function
depends on a single real-valued parameter. Under the additional assumption that the scores are all different
with probability 1, this provides a unique ordering for each request. Then, the whole problem reduces to
optimizing the value of this parameter. We have provided an algorithm for that that relies on simulating the
process to obtain estimates.
Our model and results might prove useful to platform owners (SEs, classified ads websites, online retail-
ers) to navigate the tradeoff between short-term and long-term effects when defining their ranking strategies.
They can also be of interest to regulators, who can run experiments with the model (based on real data)
to better understand the behavior of revenue-oriented platforms and to anticipate the impact of regulatory
interventions, which is of particular importance with regard to the current search neutrality debate.
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